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reSumen: Este articulo intenta de forma breve poner de relieve los conceptos para com-
prender el problema del tiempo, temporalidady continuidad en la Filosofía Americana 
representada por Ch. Peirce, W. James, y A. N. Whitehead. El estudio también intenta 
apuntar la importancia de la investigación en el campo del tiempo. Además, aporta un 
breve panorama de las condiciones históricas de la emergencia de la Filosofía Americana. 
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abStract: The American philosophy and the problem of time –[article]– attempts to brie-
fly outline the concepts of understanding of the problem of time, temporality and conti-
nuity in American philosophy which is represented by Ch. Peirce, W. James, and A. N. 
Whitehead. The article also tries to point out the importance of the enquiry on the field of 
time. Further, it gives abbreviated outline of the historic conditions of emergence of the 
American philosophy.  
Key wordS: Time, Temporality, Continuum, Concreteness, Actuality; Ch. Peirce, W. Ja-
mes, A. N. Whitehead, American Philosophy.
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The time is historically speaking one of the most interesting problems and one the 
most troubling as well. We can only hardly say that the question concerning the time and 
its nature has been sufficiently or satisfactorily answered. So the time somehow remains 
«the best known unknown» to paraphrase St. Augustine. The question about the nature of 
time is tempting not only for us today, as we are under the constant pressure of a lack of 
time – or at least we feel it this way. But, how do the American philosophers try to answer 
this question? What do they say about the nature of time? What does time mean to them? 
These are questions I try to briefly answer. 
The American philosophy and the problem of time is the name of paper in which I 
try to follow how the American philosophy understands the problem of time; try to open 
new perspectives of a discourse and evaluation between the European, so called Conti-
nental, philosophy and the American philosophy on the field of the problem of time and 
its understanding; and try to outline briefly the specificity of the American philosophy, 
how it could be understood, what the roots of it are. These are key problems of the paper 
I attempt to briefly answer, comprehend and outline within the context not only of history 
of philosophy for further discussions. 
The American philosophy is represented –in my work– by Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1839–1914), William James (1842–1910), and Alfred Whitehead (1861–1947). As it is 
clearly visible, even the very choice of these philosophers is interesting, and it is so for 
couple of reasons. Firstly, neither one of them is a philosopher out of the academic trai-
ning – Peirce graduated from science and later chemistry (Peirce was the first student who 
graduated summa cum laude in Chemistry from Harvard University in 1863; Hookway 
1985: 4);  James was physician, a medical doctor; Whitehead was mathematician. Se-
condly, the choice of these philosophers represents the philosophies, or better said the 
philosophic movements genuine for the United States. This means that the trio is chosen 
purposefully for the reason of their contribution to philosophy. In short, Peirce is chosen 
for the Peircean pragmatism – later on he called it Pragmaticism (by which he tried to 
highlight the difference of his viewpoint from the James’ one); James is chosen for the 
Radical Empiricism and his viewpoint of Pragmatism (which became influential not only
in the beginning of 20th century); and finally Whitehead is chosen for his Processual (or
Speculative) philosophy, also known as a philosophy of organism as he calls it. Moreo-
ver, all three are connected to Cambridge, Massachusetts, and to the Harvard University. 
However Whitehead was Briton by nationality and origin (English to be precise, because 
he was born in Kent) he is traditionally considered as an American philosopher. The rea-
son for this is that his concept of the processual philosophy he finished during his stay on 
Harvard University and published it as a set of lectures called Process and Reality, which 
became his opus magnum. Subsequently, the processual philosophy found follower on 
the University of Chicago and later on in Claremont, California. Whitehead’s philosophy 
is by the way closely connected to the pragmatism. He himself thought of William James 
and John Dewey as they had poured a new life in veins of philosophy (Analysis of the 
Meaning, 1937; in: Whitehead 1970: 50); and in the Preface to Process and Reality he 
says he is indebted to them and notes his attempt to defend their type of thought against 
the anti-intellectualistic charges. (Whitehead 1969: xii)
In order to be able to open the new perspectives of discourse between the American 
and Continental philosophy, it is necessary to comprehend the American philosophy (of 
the chosen philosophers) from its own context of origin. It means that it is necessary to 
start with understanding the era which influenced the emergence of it, because it bears 
marks of that time in it. 
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The period of 1870–1900 is usually called the Golden age (according to prosperi-
ty both economical and scholarly) or Gilded age (as a reflection of serious social pro-
blems masked by thin layer of gold to cover and hide them), which is the period of 
economic boom in the United States after the Civil war. As the whole country was be-
ing reformed for the further industrialization, there appeared a necessity to reform the 
basic institutional fundaments of higher education which had been built on pillars that 
started crumbling at the weight of not only scientific discoveries – Bertrand Helm listed 
the seven such pillars as follows: settled natural order; transcendent deity overseeing the 
order; each person is steered toward a divine destiny; fixed space-time matrix [absolute 
time]; the theory of natural law; changelessness of the higher education system; and a 
sure progress in history (Helm: 1985: 2). 
These attempts for reformation of the organization led to creation of the Metaphysi-
cal Club on Harvard University which was founded by Charles Sanders Peirce, William 
James, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. (an influential jurist), and joined by some other in-
tellectuals of the time such as Chauncey Wright, John Fiske, Francis E. Abbot. Within 
the sessions of this club the Pragmatism was formulated as a result of the metaphysical 
proceeding of the club by Peirce and a couple years after published. (CP 5.11-13)Another 
significant factor for philosophy in the United States is its connection to science (in this 
case science means mainly the natural science). In the second half of 19th century it was 
especially the influence of contributions of Charles Darwin –The Origin of Species (1859) 
and The Descend of Man (1871)–, Herbert Spencer (and his understanding of society as 
an organism evolving its complexity according the law of evolution - First Principles 
of a New System of Philosophy (1862), Principles of Biology (1864)), and Ernst Mach 
(simplicity and economy of scientific expressions of facts – because of the richness of 
the world cannot be perceived without a reduction for the observer’s limited perception 
capacity /The Science of Mechanics: 1882/). 
Thus the Pragmatism could be seen – retrospectively and within the frame of its con-
text – as a reformative scientific attitude (or method) emerging from the downfall of the 
traditional pillars of higher education system in Unite States. All this makes Pragmatism 
to be the very first contribution to the history of philosophy which is of the United States’ 
origin. Of course, it does not mean that the pragmatism emerged out of nowhere. The 
«pragmatically» –implicitly– oriented philosophies could be found throughout the history 
of philosophy, but the explicit formulation of pragmatism is from the United States, and 
I think that this formulation is the best reflection of its era the so-called Golden or Gilded 
age. (cf. Marsoobian 2004: 35ff.)
 As we could see there is no surprise that the focus of the philosophic and scientific 
enquiry shifted toward the question of the nature of time, temporal processes and to the 
interrelations of past, present, and future. If we think over the seven pillars all seven of 
them are embodiment of rigid and motionless entities, but once the stability of the fusty
rigidity is removed, as it happened by the contributions of the science and society of 
the second half of 19th century, the pillars leave rigidity and become loose – dynamic. 
For instance these three pillars: the settled natural order could then be seen as a process 
of struggling for one’s life (dynamic on-going process of surviving); the removal of su-
pernatural entity removes the warrantor of absolute values (the consequence of this is 
still actual, maybe more and more day by day and so not only in America) and the values 
become more or less relativistic; and the fixed space-time matrix [the absolute time] if 
we remove the fixation it becomes a flux, stream, or continuum, and this continuum with 
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accordance to the scientific discoveries on field of thermodynamics is comprehended to 
be spearing towards future.
There is much to be said about the historical, cultural and scientific background of 
philosophy, namely of the American one. The period of interest –say– some eighty years 
from 1870 till 1950 – is turbulent and full of scientific discoveries both good and bad, and 
I do not even speak about the Wars. But for the brevity it is time to proceed further. Now, 
let’s proceed to the brief outline of how the chosen philosophers understand the problem 
of time. Of course there is not a space for the full breakdown of how they cope with and 
treat the problem of time. But in short I will try to give the account of what I think the 
main points are. 
The philosophical perspective of Charles Sanders Peirce comes from the study of 
Kant, as he says: «I […] had come upon the threshing-floor of philosophy through the 
doorway of Kant…» (The third paragraph of the Preface of the V. vol. of CP called His-
torical Affinities and Genesis, CP 5.12) and from the criticism of Descartes and Carte-
sianism (to this topic there are two main papers of early Peirce: Questions Concerning 
Certain Faculties Claimed for Man [1868], CP 5.213-263, and Some Consequences of 
Four Incapacities [1868], CP 5.264-317) –his criticism is one of the cornerstones of his 
semiotics that later gave birth to his Phaneroscopy that is also known as Phenomenology– 
it is similar and earlier project to Husserl’s Phenomenology. (cf. Hookway 1985: 3; Misak 
2004: 1f) So how does Peirce understand the question of time? 
First of all it is necessary to note that Peirce’s universe is synechystic (synechism is 
Peirce’s name for the continuity, deploying it from Greek word συνὲχειν (συν- –toge-
ther; ὲχειν – to have) this word was used by Aristotle in his Physics and Metaphysics in 
which the word means ‘to hold together’ and from which there is an adjective derivate 
συνεχής in the meaning of ‘holding together, continuous’ [from Latin con-tinēre which 
is the literal translation of the Greek word]).  The synechism (or continuity) is the basic 
principle allowing an existence to be existent. In other words, the continuity allows the 
potentiality of existence (that is also continuity within time and space) to emerge into 
being – ‘to exist’ means to stand out in time as an actual event, thus it is being in time.
Consequently, he sees the time as a continuum as well. Then, the synechism –as he 
develops it in the essay The Law of Mind (1892; CP 6.102-163)– is connected to a mind 
and this connection makes it possible to notice the direction of the time, because the Law 
itself is formulated «…that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others 
which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility. In this spreading they lose inten-
sity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded 
with other ideas». (CP 6.104) The mind is thus copying the continuity of universe, so «our 
awareness of time is mind-dependent, but the fact of time is not». (Helm: 1985: 24) Peirce 
explains it that «consciousness essentially occupies time; and what is present to the mind 
at any ordinary instant is what is present during a moment in which that instant occurs. 
Thus, the present is half past and half to come. […] my immediate feeling is my feeling 
through an infinitesimal duration containing the present instant». (CP 6.126) The present 
instant of infinitesimal duration does not have any independent existence (the present 
instant is then mere abstraction), because we are not able to grasp it or seize it. Every 
time the mind tries it its attempt covers a certain duration of time that moves this instant 
to the past –so reflection can never be immediate and the actuality of the instant is thus a 
matter of near past (to say it other words, ‘to be present’ could be transformed to ‘to have 
become’– to highlight the near-past shift) and it falls deeper and creates a memory and 
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thus it loses the power of affection for the presence and gains generality; the farther it is, 
the looser the connection is. Similarly, Peirce understands the future as possible (might or 
might not become fact) and necessary (as if following a certain law) from the perspective 
of the present instant. The farther the future we imagine, the less definite it seems to be; 
the segment of future – which he calls ‘remote future’ – is technically indefinite and can-
not be fully realized. (CP 2.148 – Why Study Logic §5)
The present for Peirce thus joints the pressure of two elements in a continual flow: 
(a) the potential of future which brings the final causation for motivating and helping
the determination of what the future will or better can be like; and (b) the efficacy and
facticity of the past which help creating the anticipation by its reflective character and
thus allows future to come. So the present emerges from this entangled interplay of the
overlapping pressure between the elements influencing each other, or, as Peirce himself
says: «The future is suggested by, or rather is influenced by the suggestions of, the past».
(CP 6.142)
What does this mean for a human being? Within this brief outline how Peirce unders-
tands the problem of time is one important thing missing. The thing, if we talk about the 
mind, is the life of a human. Why is this so important? Because the mortality of human 
being brings the ultimate, finite, final borderline –the limit– to the infinite number of 
chances and probabilities –in this perspective every human being can be seen, and Peirce 
does see it this way, as a set of choices and his risks– and also it creates the limit to a 
number of our potentially doable possibilities. Consequently, the death limits the future 
of a man, this means the man have to make his choices according to his decisions which 
spring out of his past experience and anticipations of future, in other words belief –in the 
present and according to his/her understanding (past) of advantageousness and effects 
(future) for him/her. This could be understood as a temporal interpretation of the pragma-
tic maxim (from the paper How to Make Ideas Clear, 1878): «Consider what effects, that 
might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to 
have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object». 
(CP 5.402)
Although, Peirce’s understanding of time and his philosophical thinking in general are 
really impressive and interesting, we now need to proceed further to the outline of Wi-
lliam James’ understanding of the problem of time. William James was a close friend to 
Peirce, and it was James who is the one responsible for popularization of the Pragmatism 
– thanks to his lectures called Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking
(1907). But how does James grasp the problem of time?
The James’ vision of the Universe is pluralistic in general. The pluralism is outcome 
of his Radical empiricist point of view that is based on interconnectedness of the indivi-
duals participating within the continuum of reality and it is only one of its features – this 
means the time is not absolute, but the times are, because nature does not have only one 
time. There is visible the interconnectedness of the individuals, because the real time 
comes in drops and it is not fixed, the drops are qualitative and individual –unique and 
incommensurable (dissimilar to each other) [they might remind us of Leibnitz’s mona-
des]. As James puts it, «the times directly felt in the experiences of living subjects have 
originally no common measure». (James 1909: 231f) Here comes the consciousness of 
the subject into play. The role of the consciousness is to draw things together and add 
an inner cohesiveness to them and thus time and space provide the ground for external 
relations, whereas the stream of consciousness provides the ground for the internal. The 
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time perception of an individual –or lived presence– gives to the individual a chance to 
think the time. In other words, there can be no time thought without one having been felt 
therefore the thought time is an abstraction from the time the individual experienced. The 
time perception, in a sequence or rather in a continuity of feeling(s) and then thinking, 
points out the James’ thought and concept of the Radical empiricism –because the only 
time existent is the time felt and felt by the subject capable of feeling it or living it. 
The lived presence then has to have an indefinite duration, which creates a shadow 
called the thought or conceived time. This is the reason why he says: «…the practically 
cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own 
on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time». (James 
1890: 609)  He understands the lived presence as a duration containing both a bit of past 
and a bit of future –a hold of the ‘before’ and an anticipation of the ‘after’–and this dura-
tion is happening within limits James calls ‘fringes’ (an outer edge, margin, periphery). 
The fringes, though, are not strictly defined or limited, and yet they maintain the unity 
of perception of changes in the stream of consciousness. They give to the lived presence 
the horizons within which it is possible to comprehend it as a synthetic unity of past or 
before-feeling which is still present –held–, the present duration, and arriving futural or 
after-feeling of anticipated as a blurred end of it. (James 1890: 258ff) 
The lived time is not a general or conceptual time, it is subjective time –this point 
plays a crucial importance for the society and its sustainability– because, if the only time 
that should matter is the lived time then there is a necessity to have a time, calibrated, 
conventional, which is not directly lived and in which some of the personal time has to be 
sacrificed in the favor of this time allowing us to cohabitate. Without this time it would be 
only hardly possible to synchronize the continuity of each individual time drop –or let’s 
say each temporality (to use Husserlian word, because the lived time is similar to Hus-
serl’s understanding of temporality) –with the others. This public time, a consequence of 
pluralistic temporality – Aristotelian in its nature –is thus rather a social contract allowing 
us to fulfill the nature of individual within the society. So this time arises from the lived 
time, but whereas the lived time is continuous, the conceptual time is discontinuous, be-
cause the attention divides the stream of consciousness and thus decomposes the whole 
of it. Technically, the attention puts stop points into the continuum by which it dissolves 
its continuity and allows the counting of the time –to measure it in the sense of quantity, 
by this action it loses the qualitative dimension– and thus to compare these measured 
intervals with the intervals of other individuals. (Helm 1985: 45ff) 
James’ concept of time, despite being built on the basis of his psychology and radi-
cal empiricism nicely fits in the pragmatic concept. Because his image of the time goes 
hand in hand with his interpretation of the pragmatic maxim, in which he states that the 
decision should be taken according to what cash-value the decision could bring. In other 
word, it is necessary to think about the possibilities of a decision in the lived (decisive) 
presence at ground of the past experience and experiences but oriented towards the future 
gain from this decision. 
In a certain sense similar to James’ understanding of time is the concept of time by 
Alfred N. Whitehead, but the Whitehead’s concept is much more complex it is caused 
by his mathematical and scientific background and he also formulated an alternative to 
the Einstein’s Theory of relativity (The principle of Relativity, 1922). So here I am going 
to briefly outline in abbreviation his concept of time which is based on his philosophic 
writings (Science and the Modern World, 1925; Symbolism its Meaning and Effect, 1927; 
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Process and Reality, 1929; Adventure of Ideas, 1933) and his philosophy called the Phi-
losophy of organism or the Processual philosophy that in a part could be understood as 
a successor of pragmatic thoughts developed further by Whitehead. 
His organic concept of the nature –could be understood as rather metaphysical in its 
nature– is based on the understanding of the Universe as a dynamic process. This process 
is constituted out of actual entities or actual occasions – which is the same thing. The 
actual entities are constant in their becoming (‘being’ of this entity is constituted by its 
‘becoming’) and perishing after which they leave a track of their existence in the world. 
These actual entities correlate to each other in sets in which they create a unity based on 
the prehensions of each other a thus they realize or objectify their potential for being an 
element in a real concrescence (the production of novel togetherness – the basic and the 
most important metaphysical principle of Whitehead’s concept). The set of these entities 
is called nexus (pl. –nexūs). Every actual entity has its endurance, according to which 
is defined from the space, and yet still the duration of the endurance remains within its 
space-time continuum, where the entity or pattern (a result of concrescence) protrudes as 
a temporal entity out of eternal objects –the pure potential, realized in actual entity. This 
actual entity is immediately (im-mediately –without any mediating factor) present with 
simultaneous entities. But the simultaneity in presentational immediacy does not give 
any information about the entity’s past and future. (Whitehead 1969: 18-28; 61-65) The 
immediacy rather signifies a cross-section between the present and future but without 
any hint in what direction is which part. On the other hand, there is a symbolic reference 
which connects both the causality and the actuality, and «the result of symbolic reference 
is what the actual world is for us, as that datum in our experience productive of feelings, 
emotions […], as the topic for conscious recognition when our mentality intervenes with 
its conceptual analysis». (Whitehead 1927: 18n) 
The symbolic reference is thus the result of experience of a man with the world. The 
symbolic reference and the presentational immediacy bring us to the point where we 
can see the multitude of the temporal systems. In these systems, it is not necessary that 
the occasions or events are happening at the same time, simultaneously. The multitude 
presupposes a synthesis of relations of the set of members allowing them to emerge in 
the way they are. This means that the time in this sense has to be taken as epochal in the 
locus of actual entity, because the multitude of events atomizes them in the continuum of 
the world. This continuum makes up the real potentiality, and thus allows every event to 
become and within the context of this continuum every event is epochal by its endurance. 
Simultaneous events do not have to be causally dependent on one another, because their 
pasts (histories) differ and are dependent on their own individual processes of self-reali-
zation, in realization (objectification) of their potentialities towards actualization of them-
selves. 
The processes of the experience creates realities of the universe containing past and 
future including abstract potentialities in their realization. Therefore, the consciousness 
of a man (ego) is conscious of what is now and here (con-scīre –‘to share the knowledge 
with’ is nice link to be aware of simultaneity of myself ego which is now and here) as a 
result of lived interconnectedness between realities and ideas. So every event is seen from 
the perspective of the observer.
The sets of actual events are held together by their immanent relatedness to each other 
and they are bound together in connections – nexūs. The presence is thus created from 
past acts that are objectively present in it. And the future is immanent in the present, by 
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which the future gives a sense to the present, because in the present it comes to a process 
from reenaction (activation in recalling) to anticipation in which the self-completing co-
mes and is constituted by the acquisition of novel content. The future is immanent in the 
present in the sense of future relations and by anticipating them the present is customizing 
the future. (Whitehead 1967: 191ff; 1946: 136ff)
Conclusion
The discoveries on the field of natural science (has) had a deep impact on the deve-
lopment of the thought in the United States and thus it bestowed the philosophy with its 
specificity, which is clearly perceivable and representable by the shift from the absolute 
to dynamic understanding of the world. This specificity is reflected in the philosophic 
concepts of all three of the chosen philosophers.  As it is exposed, for instance in how they 
understand of the continuity, as it was outlined. 
Pierce’s synechistic universe allowing existence to exist –to be in time in which the 
existence could become the concrete one, according to its (existence’s) choices which 
existence evaluates. For human being –existence– there is a limitation of death that limits 
the countlessness of the number of choices to the indefinite, and yet finite, number of 
choices within this limitation of human’s temporal existence. In this frame the present 
could be recognized as the postponed present into the near past that influences future, 
because it is based on moment of taking risks in decision which create the set called exis-
tence. Thus it is interplay of the past experience and future expectance in present which 
emerges out of this overlap. 
The James’s pluralistic view of the Universe also works with the continuity. The con-
tinuity of the conceptual time which he does not see as absolute, since the emergence of 
the conceptual time is conditioned by pluralism of temporalities whose time is for James 
absolute –because it is lived–, and their need of having it for their cohabitation. For this 
conceptual time the temporalities, having the absolute time, are willing to sacrifice a part 
of their lived time, because it brings to them more benefit –it is worth it, not only for the 
preservation of the kind.
And finally, Whitehead uses the absolute continuum of potential which allows the 
actual entities to objectify themselves and thus existence. These actual entities or occa-
sions within it tend to the concrescence with one another in order to create novelty. The 
universe is process of becoming and ceasing. Consequently, the time is understood as an 
epochs in simultaneity of happening of the actual events. The potential thus holds this 
on-going process together as the continuum. And every experience of this sense is for a 
human mind by the symbolic reference, in which the mind connects causality and actua-
lity into coherent stream, what the world is for the human –it is a synthesis the human 
calls his world.
 Even though all three of the considered philosophers differ in understanding of 
the time and continuity, they all share the understanding that the entities are being tem-
porarily realized on the background of continuum. The continuum allows the entities to 
emerge out of their realized potentialities which they have in this continuum. The entities 
are continua within this continuum which the entities share. So the decisions create the 
(actual, concrete) entity by allowing it to become what or how it is from its possibility –
the interaction on such field necessitates each entity with coping with one another, to face 
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each other, and think about the effects of its decisions that influences not only the entity 
alone but the other entities as well.
I would like to close this paper with a short contemplation about the importance of 
the interest in the problem of time. The question «why is time so important?» is a tricky 
one. Because as we have seen whatever we do it elapses some time – as James put it. We, 
people, are here on the world for a limited time, it means, we are temporal beings, limited 
by our death that puts an end to our efforts and acts. This limitation puts us under the 
pressure which becomes noticeable in the feeling of lacking the time for conduction of 
our plans. This pressure has a source in paying attention, or better to put it, in employing 
our attention to matters that do not worth it. I purposefully used the word ‘to employ’, 
because the meaning of this word has a deeper meaning then just ‘to have a job’, the me-
aning is closer to its Latin relative im-plicāre which means ‘to enfold, entangle, in-wrap, 
embrace, or also grasp’, and it has many other meanings, but generally the meanings 
could be described as ‘a reformation for gaining a bigger density’. For instance: ‘to ploy’ 
(which is the root of the word) in military means to move scattered troops into a column 
– again gaining bigger density. 
So employing our attention or consciousness means to make it spend some of our 
‘precious’ time on coping with the matter of its employment. Here the two faces of time 
become visible, because the time is not only ontological term, but it is also a deeply ethi-
cal problem. Why? Because we must choose and our choices we try to make according to 
what we understand as the best possible option for us, and here both the pragmatic-pro-
cessual and Husserl-Heideggerian phenomenologies go hand in hand. Because, the enti-
ties, which make our-selves to be ourselves, are the choices we make, and by them we can 
have an influence on the others and vice versa. This point is actually double-edge sword, 
on one hand, it can have a pedagogical effect and by influencing we can teach the others 
what is good, and on the other, there is a directed affecting of the choices and creation of 
seemingly needs (those are not needs in the proper meaning of the word) only for gaining 
profit of those who have created them. 
So the problem of time is crucial the same way for our age as it was for the previous 
times. And as I hope, now, it is more visible that the problem of time is still lively, and 
that it should become of a deeper and more serious interest in these days. The enquiry on 
the field of time is more needed nowadays (maybe than ever before) because if «the time 
is the stuff the life is made of», as Benjamin Franklin said, then we should care about it. 
Because, if our time is employed to pointless cases and our attention full of them, then we 
are losing the time and in this sense we are losing parts of our lives that are made of it. 
And thus we are losing ourselves. So the enquiry of time is in essence the enquiry of us.
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